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a b s t r a c t 
This paper investigates whether inclusive banking can boost bank-level performance, using an interna- 
tional sample of 1,740 banks over the period 2004-2015. We find that there is a significant positive as- 
sociation between financial inclusion and bank efficiency. Greater financial inclusion helps banks in re- 
ducing the volatility of their deposit-funding share as it provides more stable long-term funds for banks, 
while also mitigating the adverse effects of their return volatility. The association is stronger in coun- 
tries with limited restrictions on banking activities or more capital regulation stringency as the deposit 
channel enables greater flow of low-cost funds for high-return investments. The results are robust to in- 
strumental variable analysis, multiple dimensions of financial inclusion (supply, demand, and pro-access 
policy), and a difference-in-differences estimator that exploits cross-country and temporal variations in 
actively promoting an inclusive agenda, further confirming that inclusive financial development can be 
beneficial for banks. 
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
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The literature on the link between financial development and 
conomic growth, starting with King and Levine (1993) , docu- 
ents a positive effect of finance on growth in cross-country re- 
ressions (see, Levine, 1999 ; Beck et al., 20 0 0 ; Wurgler, 20 0 0 ;
ekaert et al., 2005 ). More recent literature reveals that the ef- 
ect of finance on growth is non-linear, with a stronger effect 
mong emerging market economies ( Aghion et al., 2005 ; Law and 
ingh, 2014 ; Arcand et al., 2015 ). Levine (2005) reviews a large 
ody of literature and concludes that financial intermediaries help 
obilise savings, facilitate information sharing, and help grow- 
ng small and medium-sized firms in allocating funds efficiently. 
 well-functioning, better performing, and efficient financial sys- 
em can affect real growth by increasing savings (e.g., Jappelli and 
agano, 1994 ) and by channelling funds efficiently ( Fries and 
aci, 2005 ; Levine, 2005 ). 
Following the global financial crisis in 20 07-20 08, a number 
f developing countries have endorsed the objective of financial 
nclusion for economic prosperity and growth. Many multilateral 
rganisations have made commitments to advance financial inclu- 
ion globally. For example, the G20 created the ‘Global Partnership 
or Financial Inclusion’ in 2010 at the Seoul Summit with the ob- 
ective to promote inclusive financial development in developing nder the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 





















































































































ountries. 1 However, it is yet to be fully explored how financial 
nclusion impacts the providers of financial services. In particular, 
he outstanding question is whether financial inclusion is comple- 
entary to bank performance. 2 
The conventional measures of financial development, used in 
ost of the empirical studies, include the ratio of the volume of 
rivate credit or stock market capitalisation to GDP at the cross- 
ountry level (see Beck et al., 2014 ; Sahay et al., 2015 ). In this pa-
er, we take IMF’s Financial Access Survey (FAS) data to construct 
 composite index of inclusive financial development. In doing so, 
e incorporate both the depth and breadth of the financial sys- 
em by using the usage and outreach dimensions of banking activ- 
ties respectively. We then investigate the association between fi- 
ancial inclusion and bank performance in terms of efficiency im- 
rovement, and how bank regulation affects this relationship us- 
ng data for 1,740 banks over the period 2004-2015. We obtain 
ank-level efficiency scores from the non-parametric data envelop- 
ent analysis (DEA), and evaluate the extent to which the perfor- 
ance of individual banks moves away from “best practice” fron- 
ier banks within a country ( Assaf et al., 2011 ; Chortareas et al.,
013 ; Halkos and Tzeremes, 2013 ). By exploring the impact of fi- 
ancial inclusion on bank efficiency, we contribute to the literature 
hat explores the determinants of bank efficiency ( Chortareas et al., 
013 ; Ayadi et al., 2016 ). 
The current literature suggests an ambiguous relationship be- 
ween financial inclusion and bank performance. Greater finan- 
ial inclusion brings unbanked firms and consumers into the for- 
al banking system. It helps financial institutions to diversify their 
epositor base and loan portfolio. Increased diversification poten- 
ially enhances the resilience of financial institutions to withstand 
 financial crisis ( Mehrotra and Yetman, 2015 ). Inclusive finance 
ith more extensive financial sector outreach and access to finan- 
ial instruments could reduce information asymmetries and agency 
roblems between lenders and borrowers ( Beck et al., 2014 ). Low 
nformation asymmetries can reduce any type of funding volatil- 
ty, as banks are able to extract deposits from a large customer 
ase ( Han and Melecky, 2013 ). The large accumulation of deposits 
hen reduces return volatility, as banks rely less on risky and 
ostly money market funds ( Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010 ; 
oghosyan and Čihak, 2011 ; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012 ; Kacperczyk 
nd Schnabl, 2013 ). As inclusive banking provides ample opportu- 
ities for customer deposit funding, it should, therefore, reduce the 
eturn volatility of banks operating in such markets. 
However, in an inclusive financial sector, banks expand 
ranches to unbanked remote areas. As the distance increases be- 
ween headquarters and distant branches, the monitoring of the 
atter by senior managers becomes more difficult (see Brickley 
t al., 2003 ). In this case, the farther away a branch is from the
eadquarter, the more difficult it becomes to transmit the efficien- 
ies and aptitude of senior managers to different branches for en- 
ancing overall operating efficiency ( Berger and DeYoung, 2001 ). 
oreover, broadening access to financial services for all income 
roups requires that banks maintain diverse product lines tar- 
eted at different categories of customers. Thus, inclusive fi- 
ance could increase agency problems due to a large product 
ix and organisational structure. The above-mentioned compet- 
ng effects imply that whether inclusive finance increases or de- 
reases bank efficiency is an empirical issue. However, if the ben- 
fits associated with inclusive finance outweigh the costs, one 
ould expect to see an overall positive relationship between in- 
lusive finance and bank efficiency. Therefore, our first hypothe- 1 https://www.gpfi.org/about-gpfi. 
2 Throughout this paper, we use the term “inclusive finance” to refer to “financial 






2 is is that financial inclusion is positively associated with bank 
erformance. 
Regulators around the world are still trying to identify suit- 
ble financial regulations that not only support an inclusive finance 
genda but also promote bank resiliency. Therefore, it is impor- 
ant to assess how differing regulatory frameworks across coun- 
ries can play a role in the relationship between financial inclu- 
ion and bank efficiency. We focus on the role of two important 
ank regulations: activities restrictions and overall capital strin- 
ency. According to Barth et al. (2008a) , high regulatory restric- 
ions on banking activities could mean fewer diversification op- 
ortunities for banks. Less diversification leads to reduced income 
treams and franchise value, which lead to inefficient financial in- 
ermediation ( Laeven and Levine, 2009 ; Barth et al., 2013 ). On the
ontrary, unfettered financial activities may intensify moral hazard 
roblems and encourage banks to take excessive risk ( Boyd et al., 
998 ). More restrictions on activities can reduce the expected re- 
urn of risky assets, while increasing the holding of safe assets. 
his could increase or decrease bank efficiency. However, when the 
eposits increase following inclusive banking, higher restrictions 
n banking activities would impede the usage (investment) of the 
dditional funds, thus reducing efficiency. Therefore, given the ad- 
erse effects of activity restrictions, we hypothesise that for banks 
perating in an environment with high restrictions on banking ac- 
ivities, the net effect of financial inclusion could still be negative 
n bank performance. 
The overall capital stringency regulation has a direct bearing on 
ank performance. When banks are required to have more cap- 
tal, it decreases risk-shifting and incentivises owners to control 
isk efficiently, implying a positive impact on bank performance 
 Mehran and Thakor, 2011 ). Relying on agency theory, the argu- 
ent for a negative effect of bank capital suggests that higher cap- 
tal regulation increases agency costs between shareholders and 
anagers, as the latter’s behaviour is disciplined by higher debt 
epayment requirements ( Calomiris and Kahn, 1991 ). Therefore, the 
ole of regulatory capital requirement in the relationship between 
nancial inclusion and bank efficiency is an empirical question that 
e explore in this paper. In this context, we provide a modified 
patial model incorporating bank heterogeneity and financial out- 
each in order to motivate this empirical analysis. Although capital 
egulation can lower bank efficiency, in the presence of inclusive 
anking the upper bound for risky investment can increase, raising 
xpected return that can mitigate any reduction in bank efficiency 
ue to the regulation (see the theoretical analysis in Appendix A). 
Our empirical results indicate that there is a strong positive as- 
ociation between financial inclusion and bank efficiency. We show 
hat this association is stronger in countries with more capital reg- 
lation stringency and limited restrictions on banking activities. 
urther, we find that greater financial inclusion helps banks to re- 
uce their return volatility and the volatility of their customer- 
eposit funding share. We also show that banks operating in less 
eveloped financial markets benefit more from inclusive banking 
ompared to banks in developed economies. We subject our find- 
ngs to an array of sensitivity checks. Our findings are robust to (i) 
sing the ‘fractional logit’ quasi-likelihood estimator proposed by 
apke and Wooldridge (1996) ; (ii) using the instrumental variable 
pproach; (iii) running regressions only for the sample of devel- 
ping economies; (iv) using alternative measures of financial in- 
lusion indicators; and finally (iv) controlling for the country-level 
conomic and population growth. 
Furthermore, we exploit the timing variations of pro-access 
olicies in the developing countries that have made measurable 
ommitments for advancing the inclusive financial development 
genda. We explore the effects of enabling inclusive financial envi- 
onment on bank performance using the difference-in-differences 
DID) estimator. The DID results show that bank performance has 
















































































































mproved significantly for those banks that operate in countries 
hat have taken steps towards having an inclusive banking sector. 
e also confirm these results using several matching estimators. 
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows: 
ection 2 describes the empirical strategy, data and methodol- 
gy. Section 3 discusses the empirical results and sensitivity anal- 
ses. Section 4 provides evidence on the mechanisms through 
hich inclusive finance can enhance banks’ operating efficiency. 
ection 5 shows the effect of pro-access policy on bank efficiency, 
nd Section 6 concludes with some policy implications. 
. Empirical strategy: Data and methodology 
This section describes the different data sources, reports de- 
criptive statistics and discusses our methodology. 
.1. Data sources 
We compile data from the following sources: (a) the bank- 
evel data are compiled from the BankScope database provided 
y Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings; (b) the country-level data 
re compiled from the World Bank World Development Indica- 
ors (WDI); (c) the country-year level data on bank regulation and 
upervision are compiled from Barth et al. (2004) ; Barth et al. 
2008b) ; and Barth et al. (2013) ; (d) the instruments for IV regres-
ions are collected from the World Bank’s Women, Business and 
he Law (WBL) database, and Medina and Schneider (2018) ; and 
nally (e) the indicators to measure the financial inclusion index 
FII) are collected from the IMF’s FAS database. 
Given the trade-off between data availability (e.g., availability of 
equired dimensions of financial inclusion) and cross-country sam- 
le coverage, we could measure FII for 86 countries over the pe- 
iod 2004–2015. We match the country-year of FII data with that 
f the bank-level data. Our dataset comprises 1,740 commercial 
anks, cooperative banks and Islamic banks (11,576 bank-year ob- 
ervations), representing 36%, 63%, and 1% of the sample, respec- 
ively. Bank-level data are sourced from unconsolidated reports of 
anks. However, we discard unconsolidated reports of banks when- 
ver a consolidated one of the same group is available to avoid any 
ouble counting of institutions. 
Considering the objective of this paper, we exclude countries for 
hich we have no information on different dimensions of the FII. 
n particular, as FAS does not have information for Australia, Ger- 
any and the USA, these countries are not included in the analysis. 
e deflate all monetary values to 2015 (2015 = 100) prices using 
he GDP deflator of the U.S. obtained from the Federal Reserve Eco- 
omic Data (FRED). The deflated series are reported in millions of 
S dollars ($). 
.2. Measuring bank performance: Bank efficiency scores 
To examine the impact of financial inclusion on bank perfor- 
ance, we use a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we em- 
loy the widely used input-oriented non-parametric DEA to mea- 
ure the efficient frontier and estimate efficiency scores. Then in 
he second stage, we use these efficiency scores as a measure of 
ank performance and regress them on financial inclusion indica- 
ors while controlling for bank- and country-specific characteris- 
ics. We use DEA over the parametric technique such as stochastic 
rontier analysis (SFA) as the latter requires assuming a particular 
unctional form. If we choose an inaccurate functional form, it may 
ield biased efficiency scores. In the case of DEA, it does not re- 
uire any functional form assumption ( Drake et al., 2006 ). 
Let us assume the sample size is n and there are p inputs and q 
utputs for each bank i . Denote x i = ( x 1 i , x 2 i , ..., x pi ) as a p × 1 vec-
or of inputs for bank i , X = ( x , x , ..., x n ) as a p × n matrix of in-1 2 
3 uts, y i = ( y 1 i , y 2 i , ..., y qi ) as a q × 1 vector of outputs for bank i , and
 = ( y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n ) as a q × n matrix of outputs, respectively. The
ariable returns to scale DEA model for each bank i (i = 1 , 2 , ..., n )
an be expressed with the following linear programming prob- 
em: 
ax ( ϕ i ≥ 1 | x i , y i , X Y ) = Max ( ϕ i ≥ 1 | ϕ i y i ≤ Y λi , X λi 
≤ x i , λi ≥ 0 , I ′ 1 λi = 1) , (4) 
 here I 1 represents a n × 1 vector of ones, ϕ i represents a scalar 
arameter, and λi ( λ1 i , λ2 i , ..., λni ) 
′ represents a n × 1 non-negative 
ector of parameters. 
The interpretation of the DEA model is intuitive. For each bank 
 , a simulated output (Y λi ) is created as a weighted output of 
ll banks by taking some non-negative weights λi ≥ 0 , I ′ 1 λi = 1 . The 
imulated outputs (Y λi ) are maximised, subject to the inputs con- 
traint of bank i (X λi ≤ x i ) , which is then evaluated with the real 
utputs ( y i ) of bank i . Bank i is considered inefficient either if the
xpanded simulated outputs (Y λi ) are more than the real outputs 
 y i ) of bank i by a scalar factor of ϕ i > 1 or if the bank is con-
idered to be situated at the efficient frontier as ϕ i = 1 . An input- 
riented efficiency score of bank i is defined as e i = 1 / ϕ i (0 ≤ e i ≤
) . With the DEA method, an efficiency score of one means that 
he bank is situated at the efficient frontier and is unable to pro- 
uce further outputs without increasing its inputs. An efficiency 
core of less than one means that the bank is comparatively ineffi- 
ient, and should produce the current level of outputs with fewer 
nputs. 
Banks’ efficiencies are calculated relative to a common fron- 
ier separately for each year by pooling data for each country. The 
dvantage of this approach is that it allows us to estimate effi- 
iency differentials not only between banks within countries but 
etween banks across countries due to the same benchmark (see 
hortareas et al., 2013 ). We follow the intermediation approach 
f Sealey and Lindley (1977) . In this approach, financial institu- 
ions use deposits, labour, and physical capital as inputs to pro- 
uce interest-earning assets, that is, loans and investments. In our 
odel, we have three inputs (i.e., total deposits, money market and 
ther funds; personnel expenses; and total fixed assets) and three 
utputs (total loans; total other earning assets, and total non-interest 
ncome ). Table OA1 in the online appendix shows the descriptive 
tatistics of the inputs and outputs. 
.3. Constructing a financial inclusion index 
Policymakers identify financial outreach and usage of financial 
ervices as the main indicators of financial inclusion. There is lack 
f consistent data across countries on affordability and other infor- 
al dimensions. Therefore, following Ahamed and Mallick (2019) , 
e use financial outreach and usage dimensions to construct FII. 
e use financial outreach dimension to account for the pervasive- 
ess of outreach of the banking sector in terms of their phys- 
cal outlets. Physical distance to the point of financial services 
s deemed to be an important impediment to financial inclusion 
see Allen et al., 2014 ). Following Beck et al. (2007) , we use two
lasses of penetration of banking services, i.e., demographic and 
eographic penetration of bank branch and ATM, and create a sub- 
ndex of outreach. For demographic penetration, we use the num- 
er of bank branches and the number of ATMs per 10 0,0 0 0 people,
hereas for geographic penetration, we use the number of bank 
ranches and the number of ATMs per 1,0 0 0 square kilometres. 
or the usage dimension, we use the number of bank accounts per 
,0 0 0 adults to integrate the depth of financial access. 
Financial inclusion is a multidimensional concept. Using a stan- 
alone indicator of financial inclusion would provide an incom- 
rehensive picture of the inclusiveness of the financial sector and, 
ence, implications on bank efficiency. Therefore, we build upon 






















































































eck et al. (2007) to construct a composite weighted index of fi- 
ancial inclusion using principal component analysis (PCA) as fol- 
ows: 
 II = 
n ∑ 
i =1 
w i j X i (5) 
 here w i j denotes the component’s loadings or weights; and 
 i denotes the original inclusion indicators. First, we apply PCA to 
stimate the financial outreach dimension from a group of four 
orrelated indicators related to the outreach mentioned above. Sec- 
nd, we apply PCA again to estimate the overall FII by using finan- 
ial outreach sub-index and usage as variables. 3 In PCA, the first 
rincipal component is the single linear combination of the finan- 
ial inclusion indicators, explaining most of the variation. 
In the case of the financial outreach dimension, the first prin- 
ipal component (PC) explains approximately 68% of the variations 
ith an eigenvalue of more than one, that is, 2.88. This dimension 
s calculated using weights (i.e., 0.52, 0.52, 0.48, and 0.47) assigned 
o the first PC. In constructing FII, we find two PCs with eigenval- 
es of 1.80 and 0.20. Again, the first PC explains approximately 90% 
f the corresponding sample variance (see the online appendix Ta- 
le OA2). As only the first PC has an eigenvalue of more than one, 
ccording to the Kaiser rule, we assume that it sufficiently explains 
he common variation among these dimensions. 4 The parametric 
ethods that we apply for constructing the FII assign factor load- 
ngs (weights) on each dimension. We use these weights to con- 
truct the FII as in Eq. (5) . It is noted that the usage dimension has
elatively much lower weights than does the financial outreach di- 
ension. We normalise the FII and assign each country along a 0–
 scale for ease of interpretation in the subsequent analyses, where 
ero indicates financial exclusion and one indicates financial inclu- 
ion. 
.4. Bank- and country-specific variables with bank regulatory 
ndicators 
Following the banking literature, we use several bank and coun- 
ry characteristics that can be correlated with bank efficiency. 
pecifically, we use the logarithm of total asset ( LogTA ) to account 
or scale economies of individual banks. To account for liquidity 
isk, capital risk, and loan portfolio risk, the ratio of total loans 
o deposits ( LIQ ), the ratio of shareholder’s equity to total assets 
 EQA ), and the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans ( LLP ) are
sed, respectively. Next, there are two macroeconomic control vari- 
bles. First, the real GDP growth rate ( GDP ) is used to control for
conomic growth. Second, population growth ( Pop_gr ) is used to 
ccount for the demand of financial services. We also check the 
ensitivity of baseline results using an array of additional country- 
evel variables related to the country-level economic growth and 
opulation growth. 
To test whether different regulatory practices across countries 
lay a role in the relationship between financial inclusion and bank 
fficiency, we use two key indicators related to the banking regu- 
ation and supervision surveys of Barth et al. (2004) ; Barth et al. 
2008b) ; and Barth et al. (2013) for the period 20 04–20 07, 20 08–
011, and 2012–2015, respectively. These variables have been de- 
ned in Barth et al. (2004) . AR (activity restrictions) measure 3 Before using PCA, we, first, winsorise each indicator at the 95th percentile level 
o reduce the influence at the upper tail. Second, we normalise each indicator to 
ave values between zero and one to ascertain that the scale in which they are 
easured is immaterial. We have also excluded economies from the sample if ob- 
ervations of any of the indicators are missing. 
4 Dropping some PCs may help reducing a portion of noise components from our 









4 he degree of restrictions imposed on a bank’s activity. CS (cap- 
tal stringency) measures the degree of capital risk management 
estrictions that incorporate certain risk elements, and it also 
educts market losses in setting up capital adequacy. 
.5. Descriptive statistics and methodology 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables. While 
able B1 in the appendix presents the variable definitions, the on- 
ine appendix OA3 presents the correlation matrix. The average 
echnical efficiency is 0.35, with a standard deviation of 0.20. The 
igher standard deviation suggests that there is substantial vari- 
tion in the levels of efficiency scores. The average LogTA is 6.87 
ith a standard deviation of 1.55, indicating heterogeneous sizes of 
anks. The averages of LIQ and EQA are 0.72 and 0.10, respectively. 
LP has a standard deviation of 0.02, with an average of just 0.01. 
he average volatility of customer deposits ( σ CDEP ) is 0.03 with a 
tandard deviation of 0.06, indicating that there is substantial vari- 
tion in the volatility of deposit funding among banks. 
The average return volatility ( σ roa ) is 0.004 with a standard de- 
iation of 0.006. The average FII is 0.29, with a standard deviation 
f 0.24, indicating considerable heterogeneity in the inclusiveness 
f financial sectors across countries. The variation in financial out- 
each and usage dimensions is also considerably high. Table 2 re- 
orts the average values of bank efficiency and financial inclusion 
ndicators. Whereas Japan, Malta, and Portugal have the most in- 
lusive financial sectors, South Sudan, Chad, and the Democratic 
epublic of Congo have the least inclusive financial sectors. Fig. 1 
hows the evolution of financial inclusion and its associated di- 
ensions, indicating a clear uptrend for the sample period. 
We examine the impact of financial inclusion on bank perfor- 
ance by running several regressions that use the following base- 
ine model: 
f f i jt = β0 + β1 F inancialInclusio n jt + β2 B C i jt + β3 K C jt 
+ Yea r t + ε i jt (6) 
 here the i, j, and t subscripts indicate bank, country and year, 
espectively. Eff is bank-level technical efficiency, measured con- 
idering an efficient frontier, as a performance indicator. BC and 
C are bank- and country-specific control variables, respectively. 
ur main explanatory variable of interest is financial inclusion and 
ts associated dimensions, measured at the country level. Year is 
 yearly dummy variable controlling inter alia for other macroe- 
onomic and time-varying global business cycle effects. Eq. (6) is 
M.M. Ahamed, S.J. Ho, S.K. Mallick et al. Journal of Banking and Finance 124 (2021) 106055 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
This table shows the total sample summary statistics for the bank-specific variables, macroeconomic variables and 
the variables that are used as instruments in the instrumental variable regressions throughout the paper. Detailed 
definitions and the sources of the variables are provided in Appendix Table B1 . The full sample contains 11,576 
bank-year observations. This table consists of three parts. The descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, 
that is, EFF, is used to proxy for technical efficiency of individual banks, are in the first part along with all bank- 
specific controls. Country-specific variables are in the second part followed by the instrumental variables in the 
final part. Coverage: 2004-15. 
Variables Mean Median Std.dev. Min. Max. # of countries # of obs 
Bank-specific variables 
EFF 0.35 0.31 0.20 0.01 1.00 86 11576 
LogTA 6.87 6.85 1.55 3.07 10.76 86 11576 
LIQ 0.72 0.63 0.37 0.11 2.50 86 11576 
EQA 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.49 86 11576 
LLP 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.12 86 11576 
σ CDEP 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.55 86 11101 
σ roa 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 86 11169 
Country-specific variables 
Financial Inclusion Index 0.29 0.23 0.24 0.01 0.99 86 86 
Financial outreach 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.00 0.95 86 86 
Usage 0.34 0.28 0.27 0.01 1.00 86 86 
GDP 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.09 86 86 
Pop_gr 1.42 1.35 1.21 -1.31 4.33 86 86 
Activities restrictions 7.87 8.07 1.74 3.00 11.83 77 77 
Overall capital stringency 4.14 4.00 1.53 1.00 7.00 76 76 
Instrumental variables 
Share of informal economy 31.11 30.74 11.13 8.70 65.08 75 75 

































































stimated employing the Simar and Wilson (2007) parametric re- 
ression bootstrapping. This approach incorporates the parametric 
tructure and distributional assumptions of the equations to esti- 
ate bootstrap confidence intervals for the parameter estimates 
ˆ 
1 − ˆ β3 . This is achieved by using 2,0 0 0 bootstrap replications. As 
 sensitivity analysis, we also estimate Eq. (6) using the fractional 
ogit estimator proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) . 
. Empirical results: Financial inclusion and bank performance 
In this section, combining both bank- and country-level vari- 
bles, we test whether greater financial inclusion enhances or im- 
edes bank-level efficiency. In doing so, we use the truncated re- 
ression model proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) , in which 
,0 0 0 bootstrap replications are employed to estimate confidence 
ntervals. 
Table 3 reports the estimated parameters. 5 Column 1 shows the 
elationship between the FII and bank efficiency, whereas columns 
 (3) show the association between the financial outreach (us- 
ge) dimension and bank efficiency. The FII coefficient is posi- 
ive at the 1% level of statistical significance. It suggests that an 
nclusive financial sector can play a significant role in enhanc- 
ng bank efficiency scores. The effect is also economically signif- 
cant, as a one standard deviation (0.24) increase in the FII in- 
reases bank efficiency scores by 1.8%. It is obvious that when fi- 
ancial intermediaries operate in a more inclusive environment, 
hey are more likely to attract stable customer deposits, reduc- 
ng return volatility, which helps them to operate more effi- 
iently. Taking the individual constituents of the FII, we also find 
hat financial outreach and usage are positive and significant at 
he 1% level. These results are also supported by recent empir- 
cal evidence showing that expanding bank branches or reach- 
ng out to customer, banks can improve operating efficiency (e.g., 
rabowski et al., 1993 ; Berger and DeYoung, 2001 ; Bos and Ko- 5 We confirm our results using ordinary least square regressions that include 
ear dummies while using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at 
he country level to calculate t-statistics. The results are quantitatively similar, and 
vailable from the authors. 
m
5 ari, 2005 ; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008 ; Rossi et al., 2009 ) and bank
tability (e.g., Ahamed and Mallick, 2019 ). 
Turning to the control variables, we find that larger banks 
nd more liquid and capitalized banks are more efficient, whereas 
anks that have higher loan portfolio risks are less efficient. Re- 
arding country-level macro controls, the results suggest that the 
perating efficiency of banks is positively associated with eco- 
omic growth and population growth. 
Next, we analyse the various robustness tests of our study. We 
se alternative estimators, including IV regressions, and exploit 
ank-specific heterogeneity. We re-run regressions, splitting the 
ample into groups based on the development status of the sam- 
le countries while adding additional macro controls. Using two 
lternative demand-side measures of financial inclusion from the 
lobal Findex database, we also find that countries with a higher 
ercentage of adults using bank accounts/savings at financial insti- 
utions tend to have banks with greater efficiency. The results are 
eported in the Appendix Table B2 . Furthermore, we identify some 
mall island countries (Fiji, Jamaica, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, 
amoa, Seychelles, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago and Vanuatu) and 
rop them from the sample if they have fewer than five banks 
uring the sample period to dispel the country selection bias. 6 We 
e-run the regression by income group and report them in the on- 
ine appendix Table OA4. For columns 1-9, we find that financial 
nclusion indicators are positively associated with bank efficiency 
xcept for financial outreach in low income country. For columns 
0-12, we find that the coefficients of financial inclusion indica- 
ors are negative and significantly associated with bank efficiency. 
t suggests that higher financial inclusion might not be beneficial 
or banks in high income countries. We provide more evidence on 
his issue later in the paper. 
.1. Alternative estimators, adjusted-FII, and exploiting bank-specific 
eterogeneity 
So far, we have estimated Eq. (6) using a truncated regression 


























































The estimation results for bank efficiency and financial inclusion 
This table reports the mean of technical efficiency, financial inclusion index and its dimensions across countries. The number in parenthesis refers to the ranking of the country in terms of inclusive financial development. It 













Usage # of 
banks 
Afghanistan 0.183 0.027 (78) 0.012 0.043 1 Kenya 0.233 0.134 (58) 0.049 0.228 20 
Algeria 0.228 0.097 (66) 0.036 0.165 7 Lao People’s 
Democratic republic 
0.213 0.104 (62) 0.065 0.147 2 
Angola 0.294 0.134 (57) 0.101 0.170 10 Latvia 0.348 0.558 (13) 0.312 0.824 2 
Argentina 0.362 0.293 (36) 0.169 0.428 25 Lebanon 0.314 0.551 (15) 0.612 0.466 27 
Armenia 0.212 0.308 (34) 0.288 0.322 13 Lesotho 0.134 0.078 (67) 0.044 0.116 3 
Bahamas 0.570 0.540 (17) 0.395 0.691 6 Liberia 0.154 0.049 (74) 0.022 0.079 1 
Bangladesh 0.275 0.254 (40) 0.295 0.199 12 Macedonia (Fyrom) 0.219 0.496 (20) 0.308 0.697 11 
Bolivia 0.350 0.160 (53) 0.116 0.206 12 Madagascar 0.336 0.009 (81) 0.007 0.013 4 
Bosnia And Herzegovina 0.227 0.351 (31) 0.300 0.398 16 Malawi 0.213 0.054 (71) 0.034 0.076 2 
Botswana 0.286 0.197 (50) 0.098 0.304 3 Malaysia 0.528 0.510 (19) 0.218 0.829 21 
Brazil 0.532 0.437 (23) 0.363 0.510 68 Maldives 0.213 0.558 (14) 0.641 0.448 2 
Bulgaria 0.333 0.660 (9) 0.639 0.664 8 Malta 0.396 0.935 (2) 0.853 1.000 2 
Burundi 0.177 0.022 (79) 0.031 0.012 1 Mauritania 0.245 0.049 (75) 0.048 0.049 1 
Cambodia 0.380 0.058 (69) 0.055 0.060 10 Mauritius 0.332 0.719 (5) 0.694 0.725 10 
Cameroon 0.174 0.016 (80) 0.012 0.022 5 Mongolia 0.178 0.344 (32) 0.340 0.340 3 
Central African Republic 0.231 0.008 (83) 0.004 0.013 2 Montenegro 0.213 0.514 (18) 0.416 0.610 5 
Chad 0.235 0.007 (85) 0.004 0.010 2 Namibia 0.249 0.209 (49) 0.147 0.275 2 
Chile 0.566 0.460 (21) 0.216 0.727 3 Nepal 0.324 0.121 (61) 0.097 0.146 26 
Colombia 0.324 0.578 (12) 0.573 0.566 13 Netherlands 0.721 0.712 (7) 0.725 0.675 5 
Costa Rica 0.433 0.409 (25) 0.289 0.536 34 Nicaragua 0.195 0.098 (65) 0.069 0.130 4 
Democratic Republic Of Congo 0.146 0.007 (84) 0.004 0.011 4 Pakistan 0.377 0.101 (63) 0.105 0.094 15 
Djibouti 0.223 0.051 (73) 0.043 0.059 2 Panama 0.349 0.360 (29) 0.261 0.463 23 
Dominican Republic 0.211 0.257 (39) 0.223 0.290 12 Paraguay 0.263 0.133 (59) 0.117 0.148 14 
Ecuador 0.221 0.289 (37) 0.322 0.242 13 Peru 0.138 0.156 (54) 0.083 0.237 12 
Egypt 0.528 0.099 (64) 0.060 0.142 17 Poland 0.493 0.611 (10) 0.450 0.778 9 
El Salvador 0.296 0.309 (33) 0.256 0.362 9 Portugal 0.339 0.883 (3) 0.872 0.868 13 
Estonia 0.285 0.551 (16) 0.274 0.851 3 Republic Of Moldova 0.292 0.305 (35) 0.183 0.436 9 
Federated States Of Micronesia 0.165 0.138 (56) 0.119 0.157 1 Rwanda 0.133 0.062 (68) 0.067 0.056 5 
Fiji 0.029 0.192 (51) 0.118 0.271 1 Samoa 0.176 0.212 (48) 0.180 0.242 1 
Gabon 0.175 0.122 (60) 0.077 0.171 2 Saudi Arabia 0.828 0.245 (41) 0.183 0.310 12 
Georgia 0.349 0.397 (26) 0.302 0.495 9 Seychelles 0.212 0.597 (11) 0.600 0.576 2 
Greece 0.286 0.713 (6) 0.444 1.000 1 South Africa 0.406 0.358 (30) 0.214 0.513 8 
Guatemala 0.176 0.361 (28) 0.300 0.420 2 South Sudan 0.205 0.006 (86) 0.005 0.008 2 
Guinea 0.097 0.009 (82) 0.006 0.013 2 Spain 0.466 0.813 (4) 0.819 0.782 40 
Guyana 0.275 0.176 (52) 0.069 0.293 3 Swaziland 0.186 0.148 (55) 0.109 0.191 3 
Honduras 0.187 0.234 (44) 0.175 0.296 15 Thailand 0.629 0.441 (22) 0.394 0.482 7 
Hungary 0.507 0.392 (27) 0.301 0.484 3 Tonga 0.183 0.231 (45) 0.251 0.203 1 
India 0.502 0.245 (42) 0.187 0.305 54 Trinidad And Tobago 0.299 0.435 (24) 0.293 0.584 2 
Indonesia 0.269 0.238 (43) 0.216 0.256 72 Uganda 0.200 0.045 (77) 0.032 0.059 13 
Italy 0.343 0.682 (8) 0.931 0.376 430 United Republic Of 
Tanzania 
0.235 0.045 (76) 0.022 0.071 24 
Jamaica 0.338 0.264 (38) 0.179 0.354 3 Vanuatu 0.282 0.224 (46) 0.191 0.256 1 
Japan 0.352 0.988 (1) 0.952 1.000 452 Zambia 0.209 0.053 (72) 0.040 0.068 8 
Jordan 0.385 0.212 (47) 0.183 0.241 7 Zimbabwe 0.111 0.055 (70) 0.063 0.046 8 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Table 3 
The effect of financial inclusion on bank efficiency 
While in columns 1-3 we use truncated regression based on Simar and Wilson (2007) , Algorithm 1, using 2,0 0 0 bootstrap replications for the con- 
fidence intervals of the estimated coefficients, the results in columns 4-6 are based on Quasi-Likelihood estimation methods proposed by Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996) . In all columns, the dependent variable is EFF, which is the efficiency scores of banks measured using DEA. Our variables of interest 
are financial inclusion indicators: Financial Inclusion index is a composite index, constructed based on two dimensions, namely financial outreach and 
usage dimensions. An array of bank-specific controls is used: LogTA is the logarithm of total assets; LIQ is the total loans over total deposits; EQA 
is shareholder’s equity over total assets; and LLP is Loan loss provision , measured as a percentage of total loans. All bank-specific controls are from 
BankScope. The macro controls used in this study are: GDP is the real growth rate of gross domestic product and Pop_gr is the population growth rate 
(%). Macroeconomic data are obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI. Coverage: 2004-15. 
Variables 
Simar and Wilson (2007) Papke and Wooldridge (1996) 
Financial inclusion index Financial outreach Usage Financial inclusion index Financial outreach Usage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Financial inclusion 0.077 ∗∗∗ 0.075 ∗∗∗ 0.037 ∗∗∗ 0.448 ∗∗∗ 0.293 ∗∗∗ 0.329 ∗∗∗
[0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.047] [0.043] [0.037] 
LogTA 0.073 ∗∗∗ 0.074 ∗∗∗ 0.073 ∗∗∗ 0.274 ∗∗∗ 0.280 ∗∗∗ 0.273 ∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
LIQ 0.009 ∗ 0.0002 0.009 ∗ 0.065 ∗∗∗ 0.017 0.088 ∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] 
EQA 0.702 ∗∗∗ 0.718 ∗∗∗ 0.669 ∗∗∗ 3.784 ∗∗∗ 3.762 ∗∗∗ 3.642 ∗∗∗
[0.027] [0.029] [0.028] [0.138] [0.141] [0.135] 
LLP -0.351 ∗∗∗ -0.348 ∗∗∗ -0.424 ∗∗∗ -1.131 ∗∗ -1.347 ∗∗∗ -1.316 ∗∗∗
[0.103] [0.101] [0.100] [0.478] [0.482] [0.472] 
GDP 0.114 0.286 ∗∗∗ -0.169 ∗∗∗ 1.836 ∗∗∗ 1.931 ∗∗∗ 0.315 
[0.072] [0.085] [0.063] [0.380] [0.436] [0.323] 
Pop_gr 0.006 ∗∗∗ 0.004 ∗∗ 0.002 0.029 ∗∗ -0.003 0.021 ∗
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] 
Constant -0.322 ∗∗∗ -0.327 ∗∗∗ -0.279 ∗∗∗ -3.360 ∗∗∗ -3.218 ∗∗∗ -3.210 ∗∗∗
[0.015] [0.016] [0.014] [0.077] [0.077] [0.069] 
Observations 11,576 11,576 11,576 11,576 11,576 11,576 
# of countries 86 86 86 86 86 86 


























































fficiency scores in DEA are generated by a truncated data gen- 
rating process. However, McDonald (2009) argues that the ef- 
ciency scores are not the result of a truncated process, rather 
hat of a fractional logit process and, thus, is not a latent vari- 
ble. Therefore, when efficiency scores are generated by a frac- 
ional logit process, to check the robustness of our results, we re- 
stimate Eq. (6) using a ‘fractional logit’ quasi-likelihood estima- 
or proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) . Columns 4–6 in 
able 3 report the results from a fractional logit quasi-likelihood 
stimator. The results corroborate our earlier findings. In particu- 
ar, we find a positive and significant association between financial 
nclusion indicators and bank efficiency. Similarly, greater financial 
nclusion and/or banking sector outreach and/or depth of financial 
ervices increase bank efficiency. 
In constructing FII, we use the number of accounts per 1,0 0 0 
dults, as data on the number of people having bank accounts are 
imited. This approach might double count the same person hav- 
ng multiple accounts ( Beck et al., 2007 ). However, to reduce the 
nfluence of multiple accounts in the FII, we re-construct the usage 
imension by dividing the number of accounts per 1,0 0 0 adults by 
 in the case of developing countries and 7 for developed ones. 7 
he correlation between the FII and the adjusted-FII is 0.98. We 
lso check the robustness of our results using the adjusted-FII and 
nd no change to the main results (see the online appendix Table 
A5). 
Until now, we have estimated a pooled cross-sectional trun- 
ated regression model assuming that there is no bank-specific 
eterogeneity. To control for bank unobserved heterogeneity, we 
se the random effects Tobit (RET) model, as we are not aware 
f any other truncated regression model that can accommodate 
ank-specific heterogeneity in the estimation. 8 We also use the 7 We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this solution of how to avoid 
he effect of multiple accounts. 
8 We use the RET model because we could not use a truncated regression model 





7 ET model because panel Tobit estimates with fixed effects tend 
o be biased ( Greene, 2004 ). The consistency of the RET model re- 
uires a strict exogeneity assumption, that is, the error term has to 
e uncorrelated with the covariates across all time periods, and the 
nobserved bank-level heterogeneity should be uncorrelated with 
ll covariates ( Czarnitzki and Toole, 2011 ). However, the unreported 
ikelihood-ratio test indicates that unobserved heterogeneity plays 
n important role in depicting the relationship between the vari- 
bles of interest. Table 4 reports the results. The estimation results 
f the RET model also corroborate the pooled estimations that the 
II and usage dimension are positively associated with bank effi- 
iency. 
.2. Instrumental variable (IV) regression 
It is plausible that the relationship between financial inclusion 
nd bank efficiency may suffer from the endogeneity issue. En- 
ogeneity can arise if banks engage in less efficient activities in 
he current setup and venture into unbanked areas or if they self- 
elect into inclusive financial activities as such activities reward 
hem with greater access to customer deposits and allow them to 
educe income volatility. In addition, despite controlling for an ar- 
ay of bank- and country-specific variables, as our regressions link 
ountry-level financial inclusion to bank-level efficiency, the omit- 
ed variable bias could still be a concern. It may be the case that 
he composite index that we construct to proxy for financial inclu- 
ion may be subject to measurement error. Therefore, to alleviate 
ny endogeneity and omitted variable biases, and also measure- 
ent errors, we employ the Tobit model with instrumental vari- 
bles, using Newey’s minimum chi-squared two-step estimator. ies. Furthermore, by collapsing our data at the bank-level, we re-run a pooled 
ross-sectional truncated regression. The results are also consistent with the earlier 
ndings (available from the authors upon request). 
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Table 4 
Exploiting bank unobserved heterogeneity 
The results in this table are based on Random-effects Panel Tobit regressions. In all 
columns, the dependent variable is EFF . Our variables of interest are financial inclusion 
indicators: Financial Inclusion index is a composite index, constructed based on two di- 
mensions, namely Financial outreach and Usage dimensions. The bank-specific controls 
are: LogTA is the logarithm of total assets; LIQ is the total loans over total deposits; 
EQA is shareholder’s equity over total assets; and LLP is Loan loss provision , measured 
as a percentage of total loans. All bank-specific controls are from BankScope. The macro 
controls are: GDP is the real growth rate of gross domestic product and Pop_gr is the 
population growth rate (%). Macroeconomic data are obtained from the World Develop- 
ment Indicators of the World Bank. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI. Coverage: 2004-15. 
Variables Financial inclusion index Financial outreach Usage 
1 2 3 
Financial inclusion 0.028 ∗∗ 0.001 0.043 ∗∗∗
[0.014] [0.012] [0.012] 
LogTA 0.053 ∗∗∗ 0.055 ∗∗∗ 0.052 ∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
LIQ -0.017 ∗∗∗ -0.016 ∗∗∗ -0.015 ∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
EQA 0.453 ∗∗∗ 0.444 ∗∗∗ 0.453 ∗∗∗
[0.033] [0.033] [0.033] 
LLP 0.206 ∗∗∗ 0.195 ∗∗∗ 0.203 ∗∗∗
[0.069] [0.069] [0.069] 
GDP -0.042 -0.073 -0.041 
[0.054] [0.054] [0.052] 
Pop_gr 0.006 ∗∗ 0.004 ∗ 0.006 ∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Constant -0.054 ∗∗∗ -0.044 ∗∗ -0.053 ∗∗∗
[0.019] [0.019] [0.018] 
Observations 11,576 11,576 11,576 
# of countries 86 86 86 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 



























































To run an IV regression, we have tried extensively to find rele- 
ant instrumental variables. In this section, we discuss the intu- 
tion behind selecting instruments to treat financial inclusion as 
n endogenous variable in our IV regression. Financial inclusion, as 
 broader concept focuses on all economic agents in an economy. 
bout 1.1 billion women – or nearly one in every three women in 
he world – are excluded from the formal financial system. 9 There 
s a gender gap in entrepreneurship where women are underrep- 
esented compared to men. Access to finance remains the great- 
st hurdle for households and enterprises in developing countries 
here women entrepreneurs suffer the most when running and 
anting to grow a business. 
There are many financial and non-financial barriers that can in- 
ibit women from getting proper access to finance. In terms of fi- 
ancial barriers, in most cases, women possess a lack of credit his- 
ories, connections, and collateral, which is at the core for banks 
o lend to anyone. Non-financial barriers can take the form of an- 
agonistic legal and institutional settings, and gender differences in 
ormal economic rights in the law. 
Using an international sample of developing countries and data 
rom the World Bank’s Women, Business and the Law (WBL) 
atabase, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) explore the degree to which 
conomy-wide legal discrimination against women can explain the 
ender gap in access to finance. The WBL database contains 35 in- 
icators under eight categories on the laws and regulations that 
estrict women’s economic opportunities. It compiles data with re- 
ard to laws governing a women’s ability to enter the labour force, 
arn an income, own property, freedom of movement, work, and 
un a business. The indicators in the WBL are based on codified 
aw and regulations. Therefore, its indicators include any common 
aws or religious codes; but exclude any customary laws unless 
hey are codified. 9 https://www.cgap.org/blog/5-challenges-womens-financial-inclusion 
8 Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) find that in countries where 
omen face legal discrimination in getting a job or pursuing a 
rade or profession in the same way as men, women are less likely 
han men to have an account and to save and borrow. In other 
ords, when women face differential treatment under the law or 
y custom, they tend to have less opportunities than men to own, 
anage, control, or inherit assets and property, which in turn af- 
ect women’s access to and demand for financial services. Further- 
ore, using individual-level survey data for nine countries in Sub- 
aharan Africa, Aterido et al. (2013) also find that the lower use 
f formal financial services by women in these countries can be 
xplained by gender differences in formal employment. 
As existing studies show that legal discrimination against 
omen in getting a job or pursuing a trade or profession af- 
ects women’s demand for financial services, we, therefore, use 
his variable as one of the instruments in the IV regressions. We 
ollect information on “Can a woman legally get a job or pur- 
ue a trade or profession in the same way as a man?” (hence- 
orth, woman’s-ability-to-work ) from the WBL database for the 
ample period 2004-2015. 10 We assume that woman’s-ability-to- 
ork would have a strong association with financial inclusion, 
ut not necessarily with bank-level efficiency. We expect that the 
igher the woman’s-ability-to-work, the higher the level of finan- 
ial inclusion. We choose the share of the shadow economy as a 
ercent of GDP ( share of informal economy ) as the second instru- 
ent, which is collected from Medina and Schneider (2018) . Like- 
ise, we expect that the higher the share of the informal economy, 
he lower the level of financial inclusion. 
Table 5 shows the results of the IV regressions. Panel A shows 
he results of the first-stage regressions of financial inclusion indi- 
ators on instruments while using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
stimation, and Panel B shows the second-stage regressions on 10 See WBL data at https://wbl.worldbank.org/en/resources/data 
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Table 5 
The effect of financial inclusion on bank efficiency using ivtobit 
This table reports the results of instrumental variables regressions of IV-Tobit regression using Newey’s minimum chi-squared 
two-step estimator. The results of the second-stage regression are reported in Panel B, while the first-stage regression is 
presented in Panel A. The under-identification and over-identification results of the Anderson-Rubin test and the Amemiya–
Lee–Newey minimum χ2 test are reported at the bottom of the table, respectively. The bank-specific controls are: LogTA 
is the logarithm of total assets; LIQ is the total loans over total deposits; EQA is shareholder’s equity over total assets; 
and LLP is Loan loss provision , measured as a percentage of total loans. All bank-specific controls are from BankScope. The 
macro controls are: GDP is the real growth rate of gross domestic product and Pop_gr is the population growth rate (%). 
Macroeconomic data are obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Financial inclusion indicators 
are treated as an endogenous variable, and it is instrumented via the share of informal economy as a percentage of GDP and 
the woman’s-ability-to-work. While the former is collected from Medina and Schneider (2018) , the latter is from the World 
Bank’s Women, Business and the Law (WBL) database. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. Coverage: 2004-15. 
Panel A: First stage regression - dependent variables → Financial inclusion index Financial outreach Usage 
Variables 1 2 3 
Share of informal economy -0.014 ∗∗∗ -0.010 ∗∗∗ -0.017 ∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Woman’s-ability-to-work 0.100 ∗∗∗ 0.164 ∗∗∗ 0.024 ∗∗
[0.008] [0.010] [0.011] 
Constant 1.094 ∗∗∗ 1.058 ∗∗∗ 1.101 ∗∗∗
[0.013] [0.016] [0.017] 
Observations 11,351 11,351 11,351 
Bank and Macro controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
# of countries 75 75 75 
Adjusted R 2 0.85 0.81 0.77 
Panel B: Dependent variable - EFF Financial inclusion index Financial outreach Usage 
Variables 1 2 3 
Financial inclusion 0.186 ∗∗∗ 0.231 ∗∗∗ 0.151 ∗∗∗
[0.016] [0.020] [0.013] 
LogTA 0.069 ∗∗∗ 0.071 ∗∗∗ 0.067 ∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
LIQ 0.026 ∗∗∗ 0.005 0.040 ∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] 
EQA 0.957 ∗∗∗ 1.032 ∗∗∗ 0.898 ∗∗∗
[0.030] [0.033] [0.029] 
LLP 0.075 0.178 ∗ -0.01 
[0.103] [0.107] [0.102] 
GDP 0.842 ∗∗∗ 1.610 ∗∗∗ 0.243 ∗∗∗
[0.099] [0.156] [0.072] 
Pop_gr 0.021 ∗∗∗ 0.021 ∗∗∗ 0.020 ∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Constant -0.416 ∗∗∗ -0.479 ∗∗∗ -0.363 ∗∗∗
[0.020] [0.025] [0.017] 
Observations 11351 11351 11351 
Wald χ 2 test: exogeneity 87.08 ∗∗∗ 109.45 ∗∗∗ 90.81 ∗∗∗
Anderson canonical correlation LM statistic 141.12 ∗∗∗ 141.12 ∗∗∗ 133.06 ∗∗∗
Anderson canonical correlation LM statistic ( p -value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey test 0.02 2.56 2.12 
































ank efficiency. 11 We find that all the instruments have statistically 
ignificant effects on financial inclusion. In particular, as expected, 
he share of the informal economy has a negative and significant 
mpact on financial inclusion indicators. However, woman’s-ability- 
o-work has a positive and significant association with financial in- 
lusion. It indicates that in a country where women can legally get 
 job or pursue a trade or profession in the same way as men, 
here is a higher level of financial inclusion provided by the formal 
anking sector. 
We test the relevance and validity of the IVs used in this study. 
V methods depend on two assumptions: (i) the excluded instru- 
ents are distributed independently of the error process, and (ii) 
hey are sufficiently correlated with the included endogenous re- 
ressors. In the context of the IV Tobit regression, we report over- 
dentification tests, proxied by the Amemiya–Lee–Newey minimum 
2 test, which satisfy assumption (i). Again, assumption (ii) is sat- 11 To check robustness, we include the logarithm of GDP per capita as one of the 
dditional control variables in the first- and second-stage regressions. Both the first- 
nd second-stage results remain unchanged and are available upon request. We are 






9 sfied by the under-identification tests, proxied by the Anderson- 
ubin test. The Anderson-Rubin test of under-identification shows 
hat the null hypothesis of weak instruments is rejected at the 
% significance level. The over-identification test proxied by the 
memiya–Lee–Newey minimum χ2 test shows that the selected 
roup of instruments is valid as the null hypothesis cannot be re- 
ected at the 5% significance level. The second-stage result is con- 
istent, further confirming the evidence of a strong association be- 
ween financial inclusion and bank efficiency. 
.3. Developing vs Advanced economies: Who benefits more from 
nancial inclusion? 
Our dataset comprises 77 developing economies and nine ad- 
anced economies. Financial inclusion is a phenomenon in devel- 
ping economies. Therefore, to delineate differing effects of finan- 
ial inclusion on bank efficiency, we run a truncated regression 
odel for these two groups separately. Table 6 presents the re- 
ults of 12 different regressions. Panel A and B show the results 
f developing and advanced economies, respectively. Though we 
ave included all controls, we report only the effects of financial 
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Table 6 
The effect of financial inclusion in the developing economies 
We use truncated regression based on Simar and Wilson (2007) , Algorithm 1, using bootstrap replications for 
the confidence intervals of the estimated coefficients. In all columns, the dependent variable is EFF, which is 
the efficiency scores of banks measured using DEA. Our variables of interest are financial inclusion indica- 
tors: Financial Inclusion index is a composite index, constructed based on two dimensions, namely financial 
outreach and usage dimensions. The unreported bank-specific controls are: LogTA is the logarithm of total 
assets; LIQ is the total loans over total deposits; EQA is shareholder’s equity over total assets; and LLP is Loan 
loss provision , measured as a percentage of total loans. The unreported macro controls are: GDP is the real 
growth rate of gross domestic product and Pop_gr is the population growth rate (%). While Panel A reports 
the estimated results of 77 developing economies, Panel B reports the results of 9 advanced economies. In 
Panel C, we report the results of those countries that have a ratio of private credit to GDP that is more than 
the sample average. In Panel D, we report the estimated results of those countries that have a ratio of private 
credit to GDP that is less than or equal to the sample average. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI. Coverage: 2004-15. 
Variables Financial inclusion index Financial outreach Usage 
Panel A: Developing market economies 1 2 3 
Financial inclusion 0.301 ∗∗∗ 0.194 ∗∗∗ 0.307 ∗∗∗
[0.030] [0.024] [0.023] 
Observations 3,890 3,890 3,890 
# of countries 77 77 77 
All bank and macro controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Advanced economies 
Financial inclusion -0.115 ∗∗∗ 0.023 -0.053 ∗∗∗
[0.029] [0.027] [0.015] 
Observations 7,395 7,395 7,395 
# of countries 9 9 9 
All bank and macro controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C: Countries those have a ratio of private credit to GDP that is more than the sample average 
Financial inclusion -0.265 ∗∗∗ -0.187 ∗∗∗ -0.241 ∗∗∗
[0.037] [0.040] [0.036] 
Observations 5,000 5,000 5,000 
# of countries 11 11 11 
All bank and macro controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Panel D: Countries those have a ratio of private credit to GDP that is less than or equal to sample average 
Financial inclusion 0.255 ∗∗∗ 0.132 ∗∗∗ 0.225 ∗∗∗
[0.015] [0.011] [0.015] 
Observations 6,576 6,576 6,576 
# of countries 81 81 81 
All bank and macro controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Developing economies: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Botswana, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Costa Rica, Croatia, Democratic 
Republic Of Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federated States Of Micronesia, Fiji, 
Gabon, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Macedonia (FYR), Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritania, Mongolia, Montene- 
gro, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Republic Of Moldova, Rwanda, Samoa, Seychelles, South 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tonga, Trinidad And Tobago, Uganda, United Republic Of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zim- 
babwe, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Latvia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Thailand. 




































nclusion indicators for the sake of brevity. The results of the sub- 
ample of developing economies are in line with our earlier find- 
ngs. Regarding advanced economies, we find either an insignifi- 
ant or negative significant effect of different inclusion dimensions 
n bank efficiency. It suggests that there is no additional bene- 
t from financial inclusion in advanced countries as over 90% of 
dults already have access to banking services in these countries. 
To examine why financial inclusion and usage might have a 
egative effect on bank efficiency in advanced countries, we di- 
ided our sample into two groups based on the level of financial 
evelopment ( private credit to GDP) : (i) High financial deepening –
 sample of countries with private credit to GDP ratio being more 
han the sample average; and (ii) Low financial deepening – a sam- 
le of countries with private credit to GDP ratio being less than or 
qual to the sample average. The estimated results of these two 
roups are reported in Panel C and Panel D, respectively. This ap- 
roach should delineate whether financial inclusion indicators ac- 
ually influence the productive efficiency of banks that operate in 10 hose countries which have lower financial deepening in the same 
ay as with banks that operate in countries with greater financial 
eepening. As the literature shows that greater financial deepen- 
ng is not necessarily a reflection of an inclusive financial sector, 
e should see a differential effect of financial inclusion indicators 
or these two groups of countries. According to Beck et al. (2014) , 
hough private credit to GDP has been used as one of the indica- 
ors of financial development, it fails to measure the breadth of 
he financial system properly, that is, it does not show the extent 
o which financial intermediaries cater services to smaller and geo- 
raphically more dispersed customers. Though the results of Panel 
 are consistent with our earlier findings, Panel C coincides with 
he results of advanced economies. It suggests a contrasting ef- 
ect of financial inclusion indicators for two groups of countries in 
erms of the degree of financial deepening. In other words, though 
reater financial inclusion enhances bank efficiency in countries 
hat have a less-deepened financial system, it reduces bank effi- 
iency in countries that have greater financial deepening. In the 
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Table 7 
Quantile regression approach 
The dependent variable is EFF, which is the efficiency scores of banks measured using DEA. The results are based on a quantile regression 
approach. We use bootstrapping to obtain consistent standard errors, which are reported in the brackets. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI. Coverage: 2004-15. 
VARIABLES Bank performance 
Quantile → 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Financial inclusion 0.012 0.026 ∗∗∗ 0.041 ∗∗∗ 0.042 ∗∗∗ 0.038 ∗∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗ -0.003 -0.014 -0.025 
[0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.011] [0.016] [0.024] 
LogTA 0.053 ∗∗∗ 0.055 ∗∗∗ 0.058 ∗∗∗ 0.060 ∗∗∗ 0.065 ∗∗∗ 0.071 ∗∗∗ 0.077 ∗∗∗ 0.085 ∗∗∗ 0.094 ∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] 
LIQ 0.046 ∗∗∗ 0.037 ∗∗∗ 0.027 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.009 -0.021 ∗∗∗ -0.034 ∗∗∗ -0.056 ∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.009] [0.013] 
EQA 0.277 ∗∗∗ 0.393 ∗∗∗ 0.506 ∗∗∗ 0.601 ∗∗∗ 0.776 ∗∗∗ 0.947 ∗∗∗ 1.110 ∗∗∗ 1.381 ∗∗∗ 1.933 ∗∗∗
[0.025] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.026] [0.030] [0.035] [0.052] [0.077] 
LLP -0.336 ∗∗∗ -0.338 ∗∗∗ -0.259 ∗∗∗ -0.177 ∗∗ 0.005 0.245 ∗∗ 0.434 ∗∗∗ 0.630 ∗∗∗ 0.432 
[0.088] [0.080] [0.080] [0.080] [0.089] [0.104] [0.120] [0.179] [0.267] 
GDP -0.538 ∗∗∗ -0.441 ∗∗∗ -0.340 ∗∗∗ -0.344 ∗∗∗ -0.326 ∗∗∗ -0.309 ∗∗∗ -0.202 ∗∗∗ 0.124 0.854 ∗∗∗
[0.051] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.052] [0.060] [0.070] [0.104] [0.154] 
Pop_gr -0.002 0.001 0.004 ∗∗ 0.004 ∗∗ 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.011 ∗
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] 
Constant -0.236 ∗∗∗ -0.228 ∗∗∗ -0.232 ∗∗∗ -0.220 ∗∗∗ -0.230 ∗∗∗ -0.234 ∗∗∗ -0.233 ∗∗∗ -0.250 ∗∗∗ -0.239 ∗∗∗
[0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.013] [0.015] [0.023] [0.034] 











































































ase of the latter, it may be due to a mature level of financial de-
elopment that has already materialised in these countries. 
.4. Quantile regression estimates and additional macro controls 
Using truncated regression, we find a positive association be- 
ween financial inclusion and bank efficiency, which is also con- 
istent with the results of the OLS regression. As we have a large 
umber of banks from different countries, heterogeneity might be 
n issue. Therefore, we use quantile regression, as proposed by 
oenker and Bassett (1978) , to assess whether financial inclusion 
as a homogeneous effect on bank efficiency. We illustrate the re- 
ationship at different points in the conditional distribution of the 
ependent variable. Table 7 presents the results. As bank efficiency 
hanges across quantiles, the estimates of financial inclusion vary 
n sign, magnitude, and significance. Though the estimates of the 
nancial inclusion coefficients are positive and increasing in mag- 
itude, in addition to being statistically significant at the 1% level 
or bank efficiency at quantiles from 0.2 up to 0.6, they turn in- 
ignificant for higher quantiles (those above 0.7). This suggests 
hat financial inclusion increases the efficiency of more efficient 
anks up to a certain point. In other words, the middle-tier effi- 
ient banks tend to benefit more from financial inclusion, whereas 
he top-tier efficient banks do not engage in serving the low-end 
ustomers. 
So far, we have used the real GDP growth rate and the pop- 
lation growth rate as macro controls. Our results may also be 
nfluenced by the level of economic development, price stability, 
nd the institutional development of a country in which the banks 
perate. Therefore, in addition to our usual macro controls, we 
heck the robustness of our results using the logarithm of per 
apita GDP, a GDP deflator, and six governance indicators from 
aufmann et al. (2010) as a proxy for institutional development. 
s governance indicators are highly correlated with each other, we 
se them one at a time with the additional macro controls to re- 
un six truncated regression models. For brevity, we do not re- 
ort these estimated results, but they are available upon request. 
he results show that even after controlling for all these macro 
ariables, our main findings remain unchanged, that is, greater fi- 
ancial inclusion increases bank efficiency. Though all governance 
ndicators have a positive association with bank efficiency, five of 
hem ( Voice and accountability, Government effectiveness, Rule of law, 11 egulatory quality, and Control of corruption , with the exception of 
olitical stability ) are significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
tronger institutional development is necessary for enhancing bank 
fficiency. 
. Exploring channels 
.1. Volatility of customer deposits and bank return 
Saving instruments are commonly used by poor households, as 
hey are of great help for households in making payments and ac- 
umulating savings ( Collins et al., 2009 ; Allen et al., 2016 ). Natu-
ally, in an inclusive financial sector, banks will have greater ac- 
ess to a large pool of customer deposits which tends to be a less 
olatile source of funding for banks. In general, greater volatility of 
ustomer deposit funding should have a negative effect on bank ef- 
ciency. However, as banks have enormous opportunities to attract 
ore customer deposits in an inclusive financial sector, one would 
xpect bank efficiency to increase in such a market. To delineate 
his effect, we measure the standard deviation of customer deposit 
unding share ( σ CDEP ) and include interactions between financial 
nclusion indicators and σ CDEP . We re-run our augmented trun- 
ated regression model by adding an interaction term and σ CDEP 
s an additional independent variable. 
Panel A in Table 8 reports the results. In column 1, though 
he direct effect of σ CDEP is negative and significant, the inter- 
ction term is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicat- 
ng that banks operating in an inclusive financial sector are able 
o withstand the negative effects of σ CDEP and can improve pro- 
uctive efficiency. These results are somewhat in tandem with 
he arguments made elsewhere that customer deposits are slug- 
ish, insensitive to risks, and provide a stable and cheaper source 
f long-term funding (e.g., Calomiris and Kahn, 1991 ; Song and 
hakor, 2007 ; Ahamed and Mallick, 2019 ), compared to whole- 
ale funding which is extremely volatile and often costly (e.g., see 
emirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010 ; Huang and Ratnovski, 2011 ; 
oghosyan and Čihak, 2011 ). 
If banks operating in an inclusive financial sector are able to 
educe reliance on costly wholesale funding because they have ac- 
ess to cheaper customer deposits, one would expect that in such 
etups, banks are also able to reduce their return volatility ( σ roa ), 
nd operate more efficiently. Using similar procedures as above, 
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Table 8 
Exploring channels: volatility of customer deposits and bank return 
We use truncated regression based on Simar and Wilson (2007) , Algorithm 1, using bootstrap replications for 
the confidence intervals of the estimated coefficients. In all columns, the dependent variable is EFF, which is the 
efficiency scores of banks measured using DEA. The variables of interest are: Financial inclusion index, Financial 
outreach, and Usage. The unreported bank-specific controls are: LogTA is the logarithm of total assets; LIQ is the 
total loans over total deposits; EQA is shareholder’s equity over total assets; and LLP is Loan loss provision , mea- 
sured as a percentage of total loans. The unreported macro controls are: GDP is the real growth rate of gross 
domestic product and Pop_gr is the population growth rate (%). In Panel A, we use interaction term of finan- 
cial inclusion indicators and Volatility of customer deposit share ( σ CDEP ). σ CDEP is the standard deviation of the 
share of customer deposits of total deposits and short-term funding (calculated using 3-year rolling windows). In 
Panel B, we use an interaction term of financial inclusion indicators and Return volatility ( σ roa ). σ roa is the stan- 
dard deviation of the return-on-assets (calculated using 3-year rolling windows). ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI. Coverage: 2004-15. 
Variables Financial inclusion index Financial outreach Usage 
Panel A: Volatility of customer deposit funds 1 2 3 
Financial inclusion 0.086 ∗∗∗ 0.070 ∗∗∗ 0.037 ∗∗∗
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] 
σ CDEP -0.272 
∗∗∗ 0.039 -0.259 ∗∗∗
[0.084] [0.064] [0.066] 
Financial inclusion X σ CDEP 1.022 
∗∗∗ 0.300 ∗∗∗ 1.340 ∗∗∗
[0.124] [0.082] [0.154] 
Constant -0.344 ∗∗∗ -0.332 ∗∗∗ -0.278 ∗∗∗
[0.016] [0.017] [0.016] 
Observations 11,101 11,101 11,101 
# of countries 84 84 84 
All bank and macro controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Return volatility ( σ roa ) 
Financial inclusion 0.060 ∗∗∗ 0.063 ∗∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗∗
[0.009] [0.011] [0.006] 
σ roa -3.005 ∗∗∗ -2.135 ∗∗∗ -3.499 ∗∗∗
[0.304] [0.505] [0.362] 
Financial inclusion X σ roa 3.813 ∗∗∗ 2.589 ∗∗∗ 4.360 ∗∗∗
[0.739] [0.839] [0.530] 
Constant -0.307 ∗∗∗ -0.316 ∗∗∗ -0.262 ∗∗∗
[0.010] [0.014] [0.012] 
Observations 11,169 11,169 11,169 
# of countries 84 84 84 
All bank and macro controls Yes Yes Yes 



















































e introduce three interaction terms between financial inclusion 
ndicators and σ roa and re-run the augmented truncated regres- 
ion model while using σ roa as an additional independent vari- 
ble. Panel B presents the results. Though the direct effect of σ roa 
s negative and significant, their interaction term is positive and 
ignificant at the 5% level, suggesting that banks operating in an 
nclusive financial sector are able to reduce their return volatility 
nd become more efficient. 
.2. The role of bank regulation 
We augment our baseline regression by adding the interaction 
erms of the FII and each of the two regulatory indicators dis- 
ussed earlier. All control variables are analogous. For the sake of 
omparability and for economic significance, the regulatory vari- 
bles included in the interaction terms are normalised to have a 
ero mean and unit variance. We present the results in Table 9 . In
eneral, even after introducing interaction terms, the relationship 
etween financial inclusion and bank efficiency remains positive 
nd significant. In column 1, the interaction of financial inclusion 
nd activities restrictions is negative and statistically significant at 
he 1% level. It implies that an inclusive financial sector enhances 
ank efficiency in countries with less stringent bank activity re- 
trictions. In other words, a one standard deviation decrease in 
ctivities restrictions enhances the positive impact of financial in- 
lusion on bank efficiency by 4.2%. In column 2, the positive and 
ignificant interaction term of financial inclusion and overall capi- 
al stringency suggests that the relationship between financial in- 
lusion and bank efficiency is stronger in countries where there is 12 tringent capital regulation. Barth et al. (2013) also find that capital 
tringency enhances bank efficiency. Taking the interaction term, a 
ne standard deviation increase in overall capital stringency leads 
o a 5.7% increase in bank efficiency in an inclusive financial sector. 
or both interaction terms, we plot the marginal effects of financial 
nclusion on bank efficiency, at different levels of regulation (see 
he online appendix Fig. OA1). It is plausible that in an inclusive 
nancial sector, the diversified deposit base allows banks to com- 
ly with higher capital requirements, while increasing their risky 
nvestments that would yield higher return on those risky assets. 
. Disentangling the role of inclusive financial policy in bank 
erformance 
In this section, we exploit the timing variations of the develop- 
ng countries that became signatories to a global policy initiative 
n financial inclusion and explore its effect on bank efficiency us- 
ng the DID approach and matching estimators. 
In response to the global financial crisis, the G20 leaders made 
 commitment at the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009. They aim to 
educe the number of the world’s unbanked adult population 
hrough improving access (for low-income groups) to formal fi- 
ancial services. At the summit, the G20 principles for innovative 
nancial inclusion (GPIFI) were drafted by three Financial Inclu- 
ion Expert Groups: the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), the 
onsultative Group to Assist the Poor, and the World Bank’s Inter- 
ational Finance Corporation ( Soederberg, 2013 ). To invigorate the 
PIFI, the Maya Declaration (a global policy initiative) was signed 
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Table 9 
The role of bank regulation in financial inclusion and bank performance 
We use truncated regression based on Simar and Wilson (2007) , Algorithm 1, 
using bootstrap replications for the confidence intervals of the estimated coef- 
ficients. In all columns, the dependent variable is EFF, which is the efficiency 
scores of banks measured using DEA. The variables of interest are interaction 
term of financial inclusion and regulatory indicators . The bank-specific controls 
are: LogTA is the logarithm of total assets; LIQ is the total loans over total de- 
posits; EQA is shareholder’s equity over total assets; and LLP is Loan loss pro- 
vision , measured as a percentage of total loans. The macro controls are: GDP 
is the real growth rate of gross domestic product and Pop_gr is the population 
growth rate (%). ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI. Coverage: 2004-15. 
Bank performance 
Financial inclusion 0.086 ∗∗∗ 0.098 ∗∗∗
[0.009] [0.010] 
Activities restrictions 0.019 ∗∗∗
[0.003] 
Financial inclusion x Activities restrictions -0.042 ∗∗∗
[0.006] 
Overall capital stringency -0.016 ∗∗∗
[0.003] 
Financial inclusion x Overall capital stringency 0.057 ∗∗∗
[0.007] 
LogTA 0.073 ∗∗∗ 0.073 ∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] 
LIQ 0.012 ∗∗∗ 0.008 ∗
[0.005] [0.005] 
EQA 0.697 ∗∗∗ 0.694 ∗∗∗
[0.031] [0.026] 
LLP -0.363 ∗∗∗ -0.440 ∗∗∗
[0.089] [0.093] 
GDP 0.165 ∗∗ 0.276 ∗∗∗
[0.073] [0.072] 
Pop_gr 0.007 ∗∗∗ 0.005 ∗∗
[0.002] [0.002] 
Constant -0.330 ∗∗∗ -0.327 ∗∗∗
[0.015] [0.014] 
Observations 11,501 11,476 
All bank- and country-level controls Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes 













































































13 To show further robustness of our results, we have used the Economist Intelli- y many countries at the third Global Policy Forum of the AFI 
eld in Riviera Maya, Mexico in 2011 (see the online appendix Ta- 
le OA6 for details on the GPIFI and the Maya Declaration). The 
ignatory countries of the Maya Declaration are required to make 
 formal measurable commitment to create an enabling environ- 
ent for financial inclusion. In total, 40 countries signed the Maya 
eclaration commitments over the sample period (see Table B3 for 
embership timing across countries). 
The signatory countries make specific commitments to create 
n enabling environment for inclusive financial development. They 
lso share knowledge with each other via the AFI membership 
etwork. Once countries become the Maya signatory, they initiate 
upportive laws and regulations for an inclusive financial system 
see the online appendix Table OA7 for the summary of the policy 
argets). 
We assume that the pro-access policies that the Maya sig- 
atory countries started have had an obvious effect on the ef- 
cient functioning of banks. 12 With the changing environment, 
anks have designed and adopted innovative, affordable and low- 
ost financial delivery models for providing services to low-income 
roups. Therefore, we apply a DID approach and explore whether 
he efficiency of banks operating in those countries has either in- 
reased or decreased due to enabling inclusive financial policies, as 12 The signatory countries are committed to lowering the unit cost of financial 
ervices through introducing policies and appropriate innovative technology. For de- 








f f ijt = α0 + αj + γ ( Pro-access-policy ) jt −1 + β1 B C ijt 
+ β2 K C jt + ε ijt (7) 
 here i indexes bank and j denotes countries. E f f i jt is operat- 
ng efficiency. The analogous bank- and country-level controls are 
sed as in Eq. (6) and denoted by B C i jt and K C jt , respectively. Pro- 
ccess-policy is an indicator variable that takes a value equal to 
ne if a bank operates in any signatory country listed in Table B3 
n 2011 and thereafter, or zero otherwise. 13 The coefficient of inter- 
st is γ , which captures the sensitivity of the dependent variable 
o the Pro-access policy intervention (for details on this method- 
logy, see Haselmann et al. (2010) ). The advantage of the DID ap- 
roach is that we are able to identify the effects of an event (in our
ase, the commitment to the Maya Declaration) on country groups 
hat are affected by institutional settings (henceforth treated) with 
hose that are not affected (henceforth control). 
To consider the DID approach as meaningful, two aspects 
hould be accounted for: homogeneous comparison groups and the 
hanges in the effort s of improving financial inclusion as exoge- 
ous. The first issue has a minimal effect on our analysis as most 
f the members are from developing countries (propensity score 
atching is employed for having valid counterfactuals in the lat- 
er analysis). Regarding the second issue, the question of whether 
hanges of effort s of improving financial inclusion are exogenous 
r endogenous is a valid concern. We assume that developing 
ountries, as part of the AFI’s peer-learning networks, were able 
o share best practices in policy initiatives and innovative prin- 
iples of financial inclusion, and thus adopted pro-access policies 
andomly. Different multilateral organisations such as the G20 and 
xpert groups on financial inclusion e.g., AFI and World Bank, help 
reate financial inclusion strategies in developing countries. For in- 
tance, Haiti’s new financial inclusion strategy was drawn up with 
he help of the World Bank ( EIU, 2015 , p. 12). The World Bank’s Fi-
ancial Inclusion Support Framework (FISF) helped develop the Na- 
ional Financial Inclusion Strategies in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and 
ambia. There are many such examples where developing coun- 
ries are supported by international organisations. These examples 
llustrate both the exogenous nature as well as the randomness in 
mplementing financial inclusion policies in developing countries. 
owever, we would like to stress also that endogeneity is less of 
 concern for us as we study a bank-level outcome variable while 
olicy change is at the country level (see Haselmann et al., 2010 ). 
n individual bank does not have the luxury or desire to opt in or 
ut of the market for policy changes. 
We are monitoring both country groups before and after the 
vent as control and treated in this methodology. Therefore, we are 
ble to control for both observables and unobservable factors that 
ay have changed over time as well. With this approach, we can 
apture the treatment effect by eliminating the effects of the other 
hanges that could have affected the treated group ( Imbens and 
ooldridge, 2009 ). Studies that apply a similar approach include 
oetter et al. (2012) on a cross-state setup for the US banking sec- 
or, and Haselmann et al. (2010) on East European countries. 
Panel A in Table 10 reports the results of the DID estimation. 
hey show that bank efficiency has increased following the Maya 
eclaration commitments. Particularly, as we control for country 
xed effects in columns 1 and 2, we consider bank fixed effects ence Unit (EIU)’s microscope score instead of the pro-access policy indicator and 
e-run Eq. (7) . We report the results in the Online Appendix Table OA8. The results 
how that the coefficient of the microscope score is positive and significant, even 
fter controlling for country- or bank-fixed effects. It suggests that banks operating 
n countries that have higher levels of pro-access policy perform better in terms of 
ank efficiency. 
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Table 10 
The impact of pro-active financial-inclusion policy on bank performance 
This table presents difference-in-differences (Panel A) and Matching (Panel B) estima- 
tions relating to pro-access policy and bank efficiency. The variable of interest is Pro- 
access-policy, that takes one if a country signs Maya Declaration and commits to take 
measurable steps to develop and implement more effective policies designed to expand 
access to financial services in year t and thereafter or else zero. The analogous bank- and 
country-specific controls are used. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (t-statistics) 
are reported in the brackets (parentheses). The first two columns use country fixed ef- 
fects, and the last two columns use bank fixed effects. In Panel B, we use two different 
matching methods, Nearest Neighbour and Kernel matching. We are interested in the 
average treatment effect for the treated. The number of observation differs due to the 
difference in the underlying matching approaches. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical sig- 
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Variables Bank efficiency 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences 1 2 3 4 
Pro-access policy 0.057 ∗∗∗ 0.029 ∗∗ 0.064 ∗∗∗ 0.025 ∗∗
[0.011] [0.011] [0.013] [0.011] 
LogTA 0.068 ∗∗∗ 0.069 ∗∗∗
[0.021] [0.011] 
LIQ 0.045 ∗ 0.024 
[0.025] [0.019] 
EQA 0.676 ∗∗∗ 0.375 ∗∗∗
[0.105] [0.096] 
LLP -0.025 -0.165 
[0.280] [0.177] 
GDP -0.319 ∗∗ -0.349 ∗∗∗
[0.156] [0.112] 
Pop_gr 0.001 -0.001 
[0.004] [0.005] 
Constant 0.339 ∗∗∗ -0.22 0.338 ∗∗∗ -0.164 ∗∗
[0.002] [0.150] [0.003] [0.081] 
Observations 6,065 6,065 6,065 6,065 
Adjusted R 2 0.364 0.466 0.804 0.821 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No 
Bank Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Panel B: Matching estimators Nearest Neighbor Kernel 
Variables 1 2 
Average treatment effect 0.061 ∗∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗∗
S.E. [0.015] [0.007] 
t-stat [4.191] [2.929] 
No. of treated & control obs. 1,241 & 899 1,241 & 4,404 








































14 The balancing tests are satisfied and are available from the authors. 
15 The kernel matching estimator matches the treated units with the weighted 
average of all control units, with weights that are inversely proportional to the dis- 
tance in terms of their propensity score. We use exact matches with no replacement n columns 3 and 4. In all specifications, we use the analogous 
ank- and country-specific controls. In columns 1 and 2, the coef- 
cient of pro-access-policy is positive and significant at the 1% sig- 
ificance level. Even controlling for bank fixed effects in columns 
 and 4, the results remain unchanged. The reason for the positive 
oefficient is due to innovative pro-access policies that signatory 
ountries developed and implemented over the years, which have 
layed an important role in the observed improvement in bank ef- 
ciency. It also indicates that increasing financial inclusion reduces 
he average costs of intermediation by increasing the levels of op- 
rating efficiency of banks. This result is also consistent with the 
xisting evidence suggesting that with favourable institutional set- 
ings, banks are better able to exploit economies of scale and op- 
rate efficiently (see Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996 ). 
So far, we have used bank/country fixed effects to control for 
ank- and country-level unobservables. This does not guarantee 
hat our comparison group is handled appropriately for our analy- 
is. This limitation can be alleviated effectively using matching es- 
imators where treated and control groups will be selected based 
n their observable characteristics ( Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983 ). 
n that vein, we use the non-parametric DID propensity score 
atching (PSM) approach to identify the effect of pro-access-policy 
n bank efficiency. Combining matching estimators with the DID 
echnique is arguably the most appropriate approach to make a i
14 obust claim while alleviating any selection bias that ascertains a 
alid control group as counterfactual ( Blundell and Dias, 20 0 0 ). 
In the first stage of the PSM, we estimate the likelihood of 
ountries being treated (becoming a signatory to the Maya Dec- 
aration) by using a logit model, employing country- and industry- 
pecific characteristics: total assets of the banking sector and per 
apita GDP. In the second stage, we match signatory countries with 
on-signatory countries with a similar propensity score. 14 For this 
rocedure, we consider two matching techniques, nearest neigh- 
our and kernel matching, to calculate the average treatment effect 
or the treated. 15 
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 10 and are con- 
istent with the earlier findings. In both matching estimators, we 
mpose a common support condition to restrict control groups to 
all within the support of the propensity score distribution of the 
reated groups. Taking the nearest neighbour matching result, we 
nd that the average treatment effect of the pro-access-policy on 
ank efficiency is 0.061. The result of kernel matching is also posi- n nearest neighbour matching. 












































































































ive. These results once again reaffirm the positive relationship be- 
ween financial inclusion and bank efficiency. 
. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the impact of financial inclusion on 
ank performance using an international sample of 1,740 banks 
cross 86 countries for the period 2004–15. We find evidence that 
anks in countries with a more inclusive banking sector tend to 
ave higher levels of operating efficiency. This effect is particularly 
trong for banks operating in developing economies, and for those 
ountries where the financial sector is less developed in terms of 
he private credit to GDP ratio. We also find that banking regula- 
ion plays an important role in the relationship between financial 
nclusion and bank performance, as the association is stronger in 
ountries with stringent capital regulation and fewer restrictions 
n banking activities. Furthermore, we also exploit the timing vari- 
tions of the developing countries that made measurable commit- 
ents to advancing inclusive financial development through inno- 
ative policies, and find a positive effect of such pro-access-policy 
n bank efficiency in a DID setting. 
These results are novel in the literature. As banks operating in 
n inclusive financial sector have enormous opportunities to attract 
heaper and less volatile customer deposits compared to wholesale 
unding, we find that the operating efficiency of such banks in- 
reases as they are able to reduce the volatility of their customer- 
eposit funding and also their return volatility. It underscores the 
mportance of a conducive inclusive environment in broadening ac- 
ess to finance and its complementary effects on the efficient in- 
ermediation of financial institutions. 
The results are robust, even when we use the sample of de- 
eloping economies only, employ an IV analysis, control for unob- 
erved bank heterogeneity, consider the sub-samples of economic 
nd financial development, and estimate across the efficiency dis- 
ribution. For all these alternative setups, we find that greater fi- 
ancial inclusion increases the level of bank efficiency. Our findings 
uggest that a financial system, which provides easier access to fi- 
ance, increases efficiency in the financial intermediation of banks, 
nd hence makes them more operationally efficient. We conclude 
hat financial inclusion is an important policy lever to bring more 
eople into the formal economy and to concurrently develop an 
nvironment for efficient financial operations. 
The policy implications of our results are manifold. The greater 
he banked population, the higher the bank efficiency in the de- 
eloping countries; hence policymakers should introduce policies 
hat are conducive for access to finance, ensuring efficient fi- 
ancial intermediation. They should make continuous effort s to 
rovide a regulatory environment that is supportive of bring- 
ng about inclusive financial development and thus improve bank 
erformance. 
Although it is well documented in the development literature 
hat financial inclusion promotes development, in this paper we 
ttempted to combine it with the banking literature to establish 
 robust link between financial inclusion and bank performance. 
his paper therefore shows an explicit link between country- 
evel financial inclusion and bank-level performance improvement 
hrough the deposit channel. As long as banks embrace inclusion 
y widening access with an aim to mobilise deposit funds with- 
ut having any immediate loan exposure to these customers, such 
rocess of inclusion will be beneficial for banks as shown in this 
aper. As more data covering both the supply- and demand-side 
ecome available, other dimensions of financial inclusion can be 
ncorporated into the construction of a composite index to explore 
he relationship further between inclusive finance and bank perfor- 
ance. 15 eclaration of Competing Interest 
We confirm that it is our original unpublished research and we 
ad no external funding to undertake this research. 
Also we declare that we have no relevant or material financial 
nterests that relate to the research described in this paper. 
upplementary materials 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be 
ound, in the online version, at doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106055 . 
ppendix A. The analytical model 
We consider a modified spatial model to incorporate firm het- 
rogeneity and customer’s locational preferences for banking ser- 
ices (see Ali and Greenbaum, 1977 , Chiappori et al., 1995 , Ho and
shii, 2011 ). Banks are different in their locations and in efficiency 
evel. We assume that there is a continuum of potential con- 
umers who are uniformly distributed on a street and have dif- 
erent wealth endowments, which are not fully observed by banks. 
Before inclusive banking, only customers with sufficient “ob- 
ervable” wealth (as collaterals) are able to open an account and 
pply for a loan. With inclusive banking, every potential consumer 
an open an account, which allows the bank to retrieve informa- 
ion about their endowments, although there could also be more 
gency costs with these previously excluded customers. The bank 
ill benefit from the increases in deposits from these customers, 
nd the customers have the chance to earn interest or to apply for 
 loan. 
We first characterize the equilibrium of the industry before in- 
lusive banking and before regulating bank activities and capital 
dequacy ratio (CAR) (see Barth et al., 2013 ). Then we analyze how 
hese two regulations can affect bank efficiency. Finally, we exam- 
ne the impact of inclusive banking and its interaction effects with 
he two regulations considered here on bank efficiency. 
.1. Before Inclusive Banking 
Following the literature, we assume that there are two banks: A 
nd B, located on points a and b of a unit street with 0 < a < b < 1 .
here is a continuum of potential customers located uniformly on 
0,1], and let x ∈ [0 , 1] denote a customer who is located at point
 . Each potential customer is endowed with an observable wealth 
 and a privately known random income ε 
 . For simplification, 
e assume that 
 is uniformly distributed over [ 0 , 1 ]. The pri-
ately known income ε 
 can be interpreted as the harvest from 
rops, which due to weather uncertainty is uniformly distributed 
ver [ −1 , 1] with a mean 0. 
.1.1. Customer’s Payoff
A customer with a total wealth (
 + ε 
 ) will keep her wealth 
t home if there is no access to banking. On the other hand, if she
eposits her wealth in a bank, she needs to calculate the expected 
eturn and the transaction cost associated with the customer’s lo- 
ational difference with the bank. 
Specifically, let θ and (1 − θ ) be a customer’s weight on her 
ocational preference and the expected return from depositing, re- 
pectively. First, for customer located at x , the locational preference 
or depositing in bank A is −δ| x − a | , and the locational preference
or depositing in bank B is −δ| x − b| . This setup implies that, ceteris
aribus , customers prefer depositing with nearby banks. 
Second, once opening an account, a customer has two options 
nd therefore two possible returns. (1) She can keep all her wealth 
 
 + ε 
 ) in the bank and earn interest, provided that the bank 
oes not go bankrupt. Let P a and P be bank A and B’s survival b 






















































































16 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published the first version of 
Basel III in late 2009. robabilities. This is the probability that a bank’s profit remains 
ositive (see Freixas and Rochet, 1997 , p.24). As will be demon- 
trated, the bank efficiency is positively related to a bank’s profit, 
nd hence P i is positively related to bank i’s efficiency. In sum, 
 customer’s expected payoff for this case is P i (1 + r i )(
 + ε 
 ) , 
here r i is bank i ’s interest rate. 
(2) She can borrow L , invest in a risky project and gain [ E(ρ) −
1 + ϕ)] L. Here E(ρ) is the expected rate of return from invest-
ent and ϕ is the interest charged for this loan L . Without loss of 
enerality, we assume that this loan is greater than a customer’s 
ealth 
 + ε 
 . To simplify notations, let V i be the maximum of 
hese two payoffs, where 
 i ( 
 + ε 
 ) ≡ max { P i ( 1 + r i ) ( 
 + ε 
 ) , 
[ E ( ρ) − ( 1 + ϕ ) ] L + 
 + ε 
 } . (A1) 
Notice that during the financial crisis, the expected return from 
isky investments will be relatively low, and customers tend to 
eep their money with the bank. That is, when E(ρ) is low, we 
ave V i (
 + ε 
 ) ≡ P i (1 + r i )(
 + ε 
 ) . 
Overall, a customer’s payoff for opening an account in bank i = 
, B is: 
 
1 − θ ) V i ( 
 + ε 
 ) − θ{ δ| x − i | ) , i = a, b. 
To have a non-trivial result, we assume that this value is higher 
han the endowments 
 + ε 
 , so that every potential customer 
as the incentive to access banking. 
.1.2. Banks’ Deposits 
For simplification, we assume that before inclusive banking, 
nly customers with sufficient “observable” wealth are able to 
pen an account and apply for a loan. In our setup, only customers 
ith observable wealth 
 > 
 can open an account. This wealth 
estriction 
 is the required collateral for lending a fixed loan L. 
ence, before inclusion, only (1 − 
 ) of potential customers can 
pen an account. 
For every 
 > 
 , there exists a customer ˆ x who is indifferent 
etween depositing in bank A and B ; namely, 
 
1 − θ ) V a ( 
 + ε 





= ( 1 − θ ) V b ( 
 + ε 
 ) − θδ
(




ˆ = ( 1 − θ ) 
2 θδ
[ V a ( 
 + ε 
 ) − V b ( 
 + ε 
 ) + ( b − a ) ] . 
It is obvious that ˆ x increases with V a (
 + ε 
 ) and b, and de- 
reases with V b (
 + ε 
 ) and a . 
Therefore, there will be a proportion ˆ x of the customers with 
 > 
 who will deposit in bank A, and (1 −  x ) of customers will
eposit in bank B. In other words, let D 0 
i 
denote bank i ’s deposit
efore inclusive banking, and we have D 0 a = (1 − 
 ) 
 




 )(1 −  x ) . 
.1.3. Banks’ Payoffs 
After receiving the deposit, each bank makes a portfolio choice 
etween risky and safe assets. To simplify, let I i denote bank i ’s in- 
estment in risky assets, and let L i be the total sum of loans made 




{ ( 1 + R ) I i } dF ( R ) + P̄ ( 1 + ϕ ) L i + 
(




D 0 i 
)
. 
The first term is the expected return from risky investment I i , 
nd R is the rate of return and we assume that the distribution 
f R is F (R ) . The second term is the expected return from making
oans to customers, where P is the probability that E(ρ) ≥( P (1 + i 
16  i ) − 1)(
 + ε 
 ) /L + (1 + ϕ) , when depositors choose to borrow
 from the bank. The third term is the return for safe asset whose 
eturn is normalized to be one. Finally, there is a convex cost func- 
ion for managing the deposit c(D 0 
i 
) . 
Following Li et al. (2001) , Marcus (2001) , Forster and Shaf- 
er (2005) , and Liebscher (2005) , the bank efficiency ratio is de- 









{ (1 + R ) I i } dF ( R ) + P̄ ( 1 + ϕ ) L i + 
(
D 0 i − I i − L i 
)} 
. (A2) 
As πi increases, this ratio will decrease and the bank efficiency 
ill increase. Likewise, as D 0 
i 
increases, if the marginal cost c ′ (D 0 
i 
) 
s relatively small, then the bank efficiency will increase. 
.1.4. Impact of Regulations 
With this framework, we can provide a simple analysis on the 
mpacts of regulations on banking activities and on CAR. First, ac- 
ording to Barth et al. (2013) , regulations on bank activities in- 
lude: (a) underwriting, brokering and dealing in securities, and 
ll aspects of the mutual fund industry; (b) insurance underwrit- 
ng and selling; and (c) real estate investment, development and 
anagement. 
Prohibiting these activities will reduce the investment risk and 
he expected return. Hence in our setup, let F r (R ) be the return 
istribution associated with regulations on these activities. The 
ean of F r (R ) is smaller than the mean of F (R ) , and hence the
erm 
∫ 
R { ( 1 + R ) I r i } d F r (R ) is smaller than 
∫ 
R { (1 + R ) I i } dF (R ) . Since 
he mean of F r (R ) is smaller, the investment in risky asset I r 
i 
is
maller under regulations. Although more restrictions on activities 
an reduce the expected return of risky assets, they will increase 
he holding of safe assets. Thus from Eq. (A2) , we expect that the 
fficiency ratio can either increase or decrease, and hence the bank 
fficiency can decrease or increase under the regulations on bank 
ctivities. 
Second, under Basel III, 16 the minimum CAR that banks must 
aintain is 8%. The CAR measures a bank’s capital in relation to its 
isk-weighted assets. In our terminology, 
 ̄( 1 + ϕ ) L i + 
(









{ (1 + R ) I i } dF (R ) ≤ 12 . 5 
{
P̄ ( 1 + ϕ ) L i + 
(
D 0 i − I i − L i 
)}
. 
In this case, there will be an upper bound on the risky invest- 
ent I 0 
i 




( 1 + R ) I 0 i 
}
dF ( R ) + 12 . 5 I 0 i = 12 . 5 
(
P̄ ( 1 + ϕ ) L i + 
(
D 0 i − L i 
))
. 
For further use, note that I 0 
i 
will increase with D 0 
i 
. 
If this upper bound is binding, then the bank’s risky investment 
ill be cut down to I 0 
i 
. From Eq. (A2) , we expect that the efficiency
atio will increase, implying a decline in bank efficiency under the 
egulations on CAR. We have the following result regarding the im- 
act of the two regulations. 
Proposition A1. The regulations on bank activities can increase 
r decrease bank efficiency, and the regulations on CAR will reduce 
ank efficiency. 
Since inclusive banking will change each bank’s received de- 
osits (i.e., D 0 
i 
), there can be interactive effects which we will dis- 
































































.2. With Inclusive Banking 
With inclusive banking, every potential customer including 
hose with 
 < 
 is now able to open an account. Since these 
ustomers are not eligible to borrow as their observable wealth is 
ot enough for collaterals, they can only deposit and earn interest 
in the beginning). In this case, V i (
 + ε 
 ) ≡ P i (1 + r i )(
 + ε 
 )
n Eq. (A1) . Hence for customers with 
 < 
 , there exists a cus-
omer x who is indifferent between depositing in bank A and B , 
nd 
 = (1 − θ ) 
2 θδ
[ P a (1 + r a )(
 + ε 
 ) − P b (1 + r b )(
 + ε 
 ) ] + (b − a ) . 
(A3) 
It is obvious that x increases with P a , r a , b and decreases with 
 b , r b , a . 
In other words, there will be a proportion x of the customers 
ith 
 < 
 who will deposit in bank A, and ( 1 − x ) of these cus-
omers will deposit in bank B. Hence with inclusive banking, there 
ill be an increase  D i in bank i’s deposit, where  D a = 
 x , and 
D b = 
 (1 − x ) . 
.2.1. Without Regulations 
First, the deposit increase (i.e.,  D i ) will vary with a bank’s 
urvival probability and the bank efficiency. If P a > P b and if P a 
s sufficiently high such that x > 1 , then there is no deposit in-
rease in the inefficient bank after inclusive banking. In this case, 
he inefficient bank may not benefit from inclusive banking. Alter- 
atively, if P a is not so high such that x < 1 , then it follows from
q. (A3) that  D a >  D b . That is, the deposit increase in efficient 
ank is higher after inclusive banking 
However, as deposits increase from D 0 
i 
to D 0 
i 
+  D i , the total 
mount of loan made to the customers remains the same (because 
ustomers with 
 < 
 are not eligible for borrowing), and hence 
he denominator of the efficiency ratio will increase. Since  D a > 
D b , the increase in bank A’s denominator is higher than that of 
ank B. 
Second, more customers may also increase the agency costs 
nd the operation costs. If more efficient banks also own better 
kills in investigation (so that c ′ a < c ′ b ) , then the increase in bank
’s operation cost will be lower after banking inclusiveness. To- 17 ether with the increase in the denominator, we have the following 
esults. 
Proposition A2. (1) Inclusive banking increases the efficiency of 
ore efficient banks; (2) If the increase in agency cost is suffi- 
iently high, then inclusive banking may reduce the efficiency of 
nefficient banks. 
Finally, we examine the impacts from the financial crisis. Dur- 
ng the financial crisis, the expected return from risky investment 
s relatively low, and customers tend to keep their money with 
he bank. That is, when E(ρ) is low, we have V i (
 + ε 
 ) ≡ P i (1 +
 i )(
 + ε 
 ) . Hence, following our argument in Proposition A2, in- 
lusive banking will benefit the efficient bank more, and the effi- 
ient bank’s efficiency will increase, during the financial crisis. 
Corollary A3. During the financial crisis, inclusive banking will 
enefit the efficient bank more, and the efficient bank’s efficiency 
ill increase. 
.2.2. With Regulations 
Proposition A1 describes that the regulations on bank activities 
an increase or reduce bank efficiency and the regulations on CAR 
ill reduce bank efficiency, while Proposition A2 says that inclu- 
ive banking will increase the efficient bank’s efficiency, and may 
educe the inefficient bank’s efficiency if the increase in agency 
ost is sufficiently high. The net effects on bank efficiency will de- 
end on the relative magnitudes of these two effects. 
Nevertheless, we can provide some results on the interaction 
ffects. First, recall that restricting bank activities will reduce the 
xpected return, and hence we replace F (R ) with F r (R ) , whose
ean is smaller. This will also reduce bank investment in risky as- 
ets. Inclusive banking will increase deposits from D 0 
i 
to D 0 
i 
+  D i , 
ut the restrictions on bank activities will impede the efficient us- 
ge (investment) of the additional fund, thus may reduce bank ef- 
ciency 
Second, as we noted earlier that with regulations on CAR, the 
pper bound of risky investment I 0 
i 
will increase with D 0 
i 
. So, when 
he deposit increases to D 0 
i 
+  D i , the upper bound for risky in- 
estment will increase, and hence the reduction in bank efficiency 
ill be lessened. 
Proposition A4. (1) Regulations on bank activities may decrease 
he positive effect of inclusive banking. (2) Inclusive banking will 
essen the negative effect of CAR regulation. 




































tal aduppendix B 
able B1 
ariable Definitions and Sources. 
Variables Definition 
Bank-specific variables 
EFF Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) efficiency scores 
LogTA Logarithm of total assets 
LIQ Total loans/total deposits 
EQA Shareholder’s equity/total assets 
LLP Total loan loss provision divided by total loans 
σ CDEP Standard deviation of Share of customer deposits of tota
window) 
σ roa Sum of return-on-assets (ROA), defined as net profit over




Financial inclusion index is constructed using PCA from 
Financial outreach The outreach dimension constructed using principal com
geographic and demographic availability of branches and
Usage The number of deposit and loan accounts per 1000 adul
GDP The growth rate of GDP 
Pop_gr Population growth (Annual %) 
Activities restrictions The score for this variable is determined on the basis of 
in: (1) securities activities, (2) insurance activities, (3) re
firms. These activities can be unrestricted, permitted, res
4, respectively. This index takes a value from 0 to 16, wi
Overall capital 
stringency 
Whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk ele
adequacy is determined. Specifically, it is an indicator de
1. Is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement risk w
minimum ratio vary as a function of an individual bank’
of market risk? 4. Before minimum capital adequacy is d
book value of capital: (a) market value of loan losses no
securities portfolios? (c) Unrealized foreign exchange los
Instrumental variables 
Share of informal 
economy 
Share of informal economy as percentage of GDP 
Woman’s-ability-to- 
work 
Can a woman legally get a job or pursue a trade or profe
Note: IMF FAS = IMF Financial Access Survey; WDI = World Development Indic
Table B2 
The effect of global financial inclusion on bank efficiency 
This table reports the results of truncated regression based on Simar 
As financial inclusion indicator, we used two demand-side measures 
Database of the World Bank. Since Global Findex indicators are availa
our data for the period 2004-11, and then for the period 2012-14 in 
respectively. Instead of running regression on the whole sample perio
periods. In this table, the only difference is that we use demand-side
of financial inclusion indicators. The bank-specific controls are: LogTA
EQA is shareholder’s equity over total assets; and LLP is Loan loss pro
are from BankScope. The macro controls are: GDP is the real growth
(%). Macroeconomic data are obtained from World Development Ind
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and Globa
Dependent variable: EFF 
Adults with an account a
financial institution to to
Variables 1 

















# of countries 105 






sits and short-term funding (calculated using a rolling BankScopre 
s, and equity ratio (EQA), defined as equity over assets, 
 three years (calculated using a rolling window) 
BankScopre 
ancial outreach and usage dimensions. IMF FAS 






vel of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation 
ate activities, and (4) bank ownership of non-financial 
 or prohibited and are assigned the values of 1, 2, 3 or 
ger values denoting more stringent activity restrictions. 
Barth et al. (2004; 
2008a; 2013) 
 and deducts certain market value losses from capital 
ed based on the following questions (Yes = 1, No = 0): 
d in line with the Basel guidelines? 2. Does the 
it risk? 3. Does the minimum ratio vary as a function 
ined, which of the following are deducted from the 
zed in accounting books; (b) unrealized losses in 
igher values indicate greater stringency. 




 in the same way as a man? Women, Business and 
the Law Database 
ilson (2007) , Algorithm 1. In all columns, dependent variable is EFF . 
ncial inclusion (i.e., Account and Saved ) extracted from Global Findex 
ly for two survey waves of years 2011 and 2014, we, first, collapsed 
to have two data points for each bank for the period 2011 and 2014, 
 run truncated regression model using averaged values of these two 
ure of financial inclusion in lieu of our earlier supply-side measures 
e logarithm of total assets; LIQ is the total loans over total deposits; 
 , measured as a percentage of total loans. All bank-specific controls 
of gross domestic product and Pop_gr is the population growth rate 
 of the World Bank. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 
x Database of the World Bank. 
mal 
lts (%) 
Adults saving at a financial institution 
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Table B3 
The timing of the countries that signed the Maya Declaration. 
Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year 
Armenia 2012 Fiji 2011 Malaysia 2012 Paraguay 2011 
Bangladesh 2012 Ghana 2012 Mexico 2011 Peru 2011 
Brazil 2011 Guatemala 2012 Mongolia 2012 Philippines 2011 
Burundi 2011 Guinea 2011 Morocco 2013 Rwanda 2011 
Chile 2012 Honduras 2014 Mozambique 2012 Samoa 2013 
Colombia 2012 Indonesia 2012 Namibia 2012 Tonga 2015 
Congo 2012 Kenya 2011 Nepal 2013 Trinidad And Tobago 2013 
Costa Rica 2015 Liberia 2013 Pakistan 2011 Uganda 2011 
Ecuador 2012 Madagascar 2013 Panama 2013 United Republic Of Tanzania 2011 
El Salvador 2013 Malawi 2011 Papua New Guinea 2013 Zambia 2011 
Source: http://www.afi- global.org/afi- network/members 
Note: the years indicate when a country made a commitment to the Maya Declaration to take measurable steps towards 
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